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NOTES 
TO SUE OR NOT TO SUE: 
VIDEO-SHARING WEB SITES, COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT, AND THE INEVITABILITY 
OF CORPORATE CONTROL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Throughout 2006, a remarkable phenomenon invaded the digital world; 
a phenomenon that could be attributed to the combination of easy access to 
technology,1 a new generation full of deteriorating attention spans, and to 
some commentators, the entertainment industry’s “shockingly slow” 
responses to consumer behavior.2 This phenomenon was the development 
and successful proliferation of social networking and video-sharing Web 
sites. These sites, which include Yahoo! Video,3 Google Video,4 Revver,5 
VMIX,6 YouTube,7 and MySpace,8—to name a few—allow users to sign 
up, upload videos, store them, rate them, distribute them, or embed them in 
other Web site pages.9 While a number of uploaded videos are created by 
amateurs attempting to attain fame and, perhaps, some fortune, several 
thousands more are copied from television or stolen from other Web sites 
and subsequently uploaded by someone other than the actual copyright 
owner.10 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Mark G. Tratos, Entertainment on the Internet: The Evolution of Entertainment, 
Production, Distribution, Ownership and Control in the Digital Age, in ENTERTAINMENT LAW 
331, 335 (Howard Siegel ed., 3d ed. 2004) (“[D]igital technology has made copying and high 
quality reproduction available in every area of entertainment to almost anyone, not just those with 
once rare and expensive reproduction equipment.”). 
 2. Barrie McKenna, Entertainment Media Bite Digital Hand that Could Feed Them, GLOBE 
AND MAIL, Sept. 26, 2006, at B17. 
 3. Yahoo! Video, http://video.search.yahoo.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
 4. Google Video, http://video.google.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
 5. Revver, http://www.revver.com/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). However, unlike most video 
sharing sites, Revver shares advertising revenue with every user who uploads or shares the video. 
See Revver, http://one.revver.com/go/about (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). Revver also screens all 
submitted videos to prohibit copyright infringement. See Revver Copyright Policy, 
http://one.revver.com/go/copyright (last visited Oct. 11, 2007). 
 6. VMIX, http://www.vmix.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
 7. YouTube—Broadcast Yourself, http://www.youtube.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
 8. MySpace Video, http://vids.myspace.com/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
 9. More technologically savvy users are even able to download the videos. 
 10. See, e.g., Anthony S. Volpe, YouTube, Viral Videos and Copyright Infringement on the 
Internet, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 6, 2006. (“You make a visit to Youtube [sic] and find 
copyrightable works, such as newscasts, music videos, sports highlights, movie clips and even 
entire television shows posted.”). 
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Accordingly, some of these Web sites have actively engaged in policing 
their sites to make sure copyrighted videos do not appear.11 Others, 
however, including two of the most popular sites, YouTube12 and 
MySpace,13 thus far have hidden behind the veil created by the enactment of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s “safe harbor” provision;14 arguing 
that as long as all of the DMCA requirements are met, the service provider 
is not liable for money damages.15 Many commentators do agree that the 
DMCA protects sites like YouTube and MySpace.16 While this strategy has 
enabled sites to avoid legal action for the time-being, however, over the past 
several months, copyright owners, who maintain the exclusive right to 
reproduce their work, prepare derivative works, distribute, perform and/or 
display publicly their work,17 are increasingly, and finally, beginning to take 
notice; and their discontent has become progressively apparent.18 
Using YouTube as the model,19 this note will explore the various ways 
in which the entertainment industry and independent creators have reacted 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Max Kalehoff, Can Social Video Honor Copyright And Compensate the Artist?, 
MEDIAPOST, Sept. 8, 2006, http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction= 
Articles.showArticle&art_aid=47853 (interview with Revver’s co-founder and Senior VP who 
stated that “‘humans watch over the network’” and screen the videos to prevent copyright 
infringement). 
 12. While writing this note, on Oct. 9, 2006, Google bought YouTube for $1.65 billion, 
leading some to believe that YouTube will now be able to concentrate more on protecting against 
copyright infringement. See Paul R. La Monica, Google to Buy YouTube for $1.65 Billion: Search 
Engine Leader Looks to Bulk Up in the Burgeoning Online Video Market, CNNMONEY, Oct. 9, 
2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/10/09/technology/googleyoutube_deal/?postversion=2006100917. 
YouTube will continue operating as an “independent unit of Google,” id., but it remains to be seen 
whether YouTube will take further steps to prevent against infringement or whether more lawsuits 
will be filed because of Google’s “deep pockets.” See, e.g., Catherine Holahan, YouTube’s New 
Deep Pockets: The online video star has found a rich parent, but can it ensure that it won’t leave 
Google vulnerable to copyright lawsuits?, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Oct. 10, 2006, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/oct2006/tc20061010_083340.htm; see also 
Does YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 11, 
2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116049721244288215.html. 
 13. According to Alexa Web Information Service, YouTube is ranked 4th and MySpace is 
ranked 6th among all Web sites tracked, see Alexa, http://www.alexa.com (last visited Oct. 11, 
2007), compared to Revver, see Revver, supra note 5, which is ranked 4,332nd. Alexa Traffic 
Rankings, http://www.alexa.com/data/details/traffic_details?url=http%3A%2F%2F (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2007). 
 14. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 § 201, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006) [hereinafter 
DMCA]. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 15. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006). 
 16. See, e.g., Heather Svokos, ‘You Gotta Check This Out’; The Passion to Share Video Clips 
has Made a Web Site an Overnight Sensation, BERGEN RECORD, Apr. 15, 2006, at F1 (“Wendy 
Seltzer, a fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School . . . [said 
that] [a]s long as YouTube follows the notice and takedown rules, it’s immune from liability.”). 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 18. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 19. I chose YouTube because each video-sharing site operates in slightly different ways, and 
YouTube is leading the way in the web television market. It boasts approximately 100 million 
videos on the site, with 65,000 videos added every day. It has also become a press target, drawing 
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to this latest phenomenon. It will examine whether video-sharing sites will 
follow in the path of the peer-to-peer networks such as Napster,20 and will 
also attempt to provide a framework leading to a solution to the existing 
tensions among copyright law, corporate control, and the digital age. 
Part II will describe how Congress has dealt with the enormous task of 
adapting copyright law in a futile attempt to keep up with technological 
development, describing the legislative enactments, developments, and 
changes in copyright law, beginning with the U.S. Constitution and ending 
with the adoption of the DMCA. Part III will examine the most recent cases 
involving Internet and peer-to-peer file sharing,21 engaging in an analysis of 
direct and indirect infringement and how it pertains to video-sharing Web 
sites and illustrating how copyright owners may have the law on their side. 
Part IV will discuss the entertainment industry’s recent reactions to the 
explosion of video-sharing and social-networking Web sites. Part V will 
provide an analysis of the reasons why it is more beneficial for copyright 
owners to work with, instead of against, video-sharing Web sites. This Part 
argues that although copyright owners may be successful in court, the 
stigma that will attach to their efforts, the financial burden it will impose, 
and the loss of a beneficial promotional tool, are detrimental to the industry. 
Finally, this Part will also propose a method by which the entertainment 
industry and the Web sites can work together to appeal to public demand 
while permitting copyright owners to maintain control over, and reap the 
benefits from, the content that appears on the sites. 
                                                                                                                 
over 3,000 articles per week. Scott Woolley, Video Fixation, FORBES, Oct. 16, 2006, at 100. 
Although this Forbes article, for example, is complimentary, several others have focused on the 
site’s blatant copyright infringement. See, e.g., Volpe, supra note 10. Others have concentrated on 
the debate pertaining to whether the site is the next Napster and whether it is liable for copyright 
infringement. See, e.g., Michael Geist, Why YouTube Won’t Become Napster Redux, TORONTO 
STAR, Oct. 16, 2006, at C3; Brad Stone, Is YouTube the Napster of Video?, NEWSWEEK ONLINE, 
Mar. 7, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11617588/site/newsweek/page/2/; Reply All, Does 
YouTube Make Google a Big Target for Copyright Suits?, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 11, 2006, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116069721244288215.html (containing a conversation between 
John Palfrey, Harvard Law Professor, and Stan Liebowitz, University of Texas at Dallas 
Economics Professor). 
 20. See, e.g., John Boudreau, How Will YouTube Make Money?  Ad Strategy Key to Turning 
Millions of Clicks into Cash, MERCURY NEWS, July 12, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 
11981946 (“YouTube’s work-in-progress business plan has raised concerns among some industry 
observers who believe the Web site could go the way of Napster. The former Redwood City file-
sharing company became an Internet star by allowing people to exchange copyrighted music, but 
became less popular as a legal site.”). 
 21. See Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax Obsolete?  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, 
Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 862–68 (2004), for background 
information about peer-to-peer technology; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 
1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining how peer-to-peer file sharing works). 
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II. COPYRIGHT LAW: A BRIEF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
A. THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND AMENDMENTS PRIOR TO THE 
ENACTMENT OF THE DMCA 
By recognizing the value of artistic expression and creativity, the U.S. 
Constitution provided the framework for copyright law. Article I, § 8 gives 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”22 The first American 
Copyright Law was adopted in 1790, and gave authors and proprietors the 
“sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” 
books, charts and maps for a term of fourteen years. 23 It also stipulated the 
requirements for registering a copyright in the county clerk’s office.24 In 
1831, musical compositions, designs, etchings and engravings were added 
to the list of protected works;25 the first U.S. copyright case appeared in the 
Supreme Court in 1834.26 In 1865, photographs were added to the list of 
copyrightable works,27 conveniently corresponding with the publishing and 
selling of Matthew Brady’s Civil War photos.28 Musical compositions were 
later added in 1909;29 moving pictures were added in 1911 “[t]hrough the 
request of industry,” and sound recordings were added in 1971.30 
While Congress continued to amend copyright laws, extending them to 
adapt to new technology, businesses in the entertainment industry began 
requiring that artists and creators convey their copyrights to the company 
representing them.31 The 1909 Act: 
[F]urthered the industries’ interests by expressly allowing corporations, 
partnerships and other business entities to be deemed the “authors/owners” 
of creative works as the concept of works made for hire was added to 
copyright law. As a result, the majority of all entertainment-related 
copyrights filed in the United States after . . . 1909 . . . were filed on 
behalf of business entities, not individuals.32 
                                                                                                                 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 23. Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790) (amended 1831). 
 24. Id. at § 3. 
 25. Copyright Act of 1831 § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (1831) (amended 1865). 
 26. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 658 (1834) (“That every man is entitled to the fruits of his 
own labour must be admitted.”). 
 27. Copyright Act of 1865 § 2, 13 Stat. 540 (1865). 
 28. See Jon M. Garon, Entertainment Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 559, 592 (2002). 
 29. Copyright Act of 1909 § 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (1909). 
 30. Tratos, supra note 1, at 340. 
 31. Id. at 342. 
 32. Id. 
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To combat industry takeover of individual works, however, Congress 
later adopted § 203 of the 1976 Act,33 to allow artists to reclaim the works 
“[b]etween the 35th and 40th year of the copyright term.”34 Furthermore, the 
1976 Act provided that protection exists “in original works of authorship 
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed,” and included literary, musical, dramatic, pantomime and 
choreographic, pictorial, graphic and sculptural, motion pictures and other 
audiovisual work, sound recordings and architectural works.35 Finally, 
“digital forms of artistic works were protected through the Audio Home 
Recording Act of 1992 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 
1998.”36 
Other amendments included the adoption of § 408 in 1988, which 
altered the formal nature of copyright laws, and provided that registration of 
copyright is no longer a condition of protection, meaning that as soon as 
words hit the page, they are protected.37 Later, the Sonny Bono Copyright 
Term Extension Act,38 adopted in 1998, extended the copyright term to the 
author’s life plus 70 years for individuals and 95 years from publication, or 
120 years from creation for businesses.39 
B. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT’S SAFE HARBOR 
PROVISION: WHY VIDEO-SHARING WEB SITES ARE FAR FROM 
SAFE 
As technology continued to advance, and copyright owners continued 
to demand protection, Congress adopted the DMCA in order to cope with 
the difficulties caused by the digital age.40 The Online Copyright 
Infringement Liability Limitation Act, which is Title II of the DMCA, was 
enacted to “provide certainty for copyright owners and Internet service 
providers with respect to copyright infringement liability online,”41 and to 
“protect the property rights of Americans in their work as they move in the 
global, digital marketplace, and, by doing so, continue to encourage the 
creation of new works to inspire and delight us and to improve the quality 
                                                                                                                 
 33. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) (“In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the 
exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a 
copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to 
termination.”). 
 34. Tratos, supra note 1, at 342. 
 35. Copyright Act of 1976, § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 36. Tratos, supra note 1, at 341. 
 37. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006). However, “[r]egistration still remains desirable . . . because it 
provides proof that a valid copyright exists. Further, registration is required to bring an 
infringement action under the federal statute.” INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR THE INTERNET 10 
(Lewis C. Lee & J. Scott Davidson eds., 1997). 
 38. 17 U.S.C § 302 (2006). 
 39. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 916 (2003) (holding that the statute was constitutional). 
 40. See generally, S. REP. NO. 105-190 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
 41. Id. at 1. 
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of our lives.”42 This section limits liability for monetary damages when 
service providers are either passive conduits43 or merely store or host 
material at the direction of users.44 Moreover, this limitation “is an 
affirmative defense, as to which the defendant bears the burden of proof,”45 
and is employed only after a court finds the service provider liable for 
copyright infringement. 
Video-sharing sites began to appear on the Internet only within the last 
few years;46 and thus far, the safe harbor protection, as it pertains to these 
sites, has not been tested in court. Most video-sharing Web site providers 
argue that they are protected by this “safe harbor” provision, and that as 
long as they comply with all of the DMCA requirements, they are not liable 
for monetary damages.47 However, in similar cases involving Web sites or 
peer-to-peer networks, some courts have essentially ignored the provisions 
once contributory liability has been found.48 Furthermore, when copyright 
owners alleged direct infringement, courts have interpreted the DMCA’s 
protection “to be a floor, not a ceiling, of protection,”49 meaning that 
DMCA analysis is just one step in the process of determining liability.50 
Therefore, in addition to designating an agent to receive complaints51 and 
adopting, implementing, and informing users of a policy to terminate repeat 
infringers,52 the service provider must also meet several requirements 
before finding refuge under the DMCA. Three of these requirements are 
described below. 
1. The “Service Provider” Requirement 
First, to be protected, the sites need to qualify under the DMCA’s 
definition of “service provider.”53 Thus far, courts have not been asked to 
                                                                                                                 
 42. S. REP. NO. 105-144, at 11889 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch). 
 43. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2006). 
 44. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
 45. JAY DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 
6-41 (2006). 
 46. For example, YouTube was founded on February 14, 2005. See YouTube Founders, 
http://www.youtube.com/t/founders (last visited Dec. 16, 2006). “MySpace . . . launched in 2003.”  
Alex L. Goldfayn, Time Flies When You’re Having Fun with Technology, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 
Sept. 18, 2006, at 7. 
 47. See, e.g., Leslie Simmons, YouTube: News Service Infringement Claim ‘Without Merit’, 
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, ESQ., July 19, 2006,  
http://www.hollywoodreporteresq.com/thresq/litigation/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=10028
41475. 
 48. See, e.g., In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 49. CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 50. Id. 
 51. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2006). 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A). 
 53. The Copyright Act broadly defines the term “service provider” to include: 
[A]n entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital 
online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the 
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determine whether video-sharing Web sites fall under the DMCA’s 
definition,54 and if courts decide that such sites are not “service providers,” 
the sites will then be precluded from claiming DMCA protection. However, 
since the language contained in § 512(k)(1)(B) is broad, “[a] fortiori it 
covers such Web presences as . . . online file sharing services.”55 
Furthermore, district courts have interpreted the DMCA definition to 
include similar types of Web sites.56 Therefore, because courts will likely 
find that the sites are service providers, the sites qualify for DMCA 
protection as long as they satisfy the other numerous requirements. 
Moreover, since they store material at their users’ direction, they fall under 
§ 512(c).57 
2. The “Knowledge” Requirement 
Section 512(c) limits service providers’ liability if infringing material is 
posted by users and stored on the server as long as the service provider does 
not have “actual knowledge that the material . . . is infringing.”58 In 
addition, if the service provider does not have actual knowledge, it must 
also be unaware “of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent.”59 If the service provider subsequently becomes aware of facts or 
circumstances, or obtains actual knowledge, it must “act expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material.”60 Once a copyright owner 
                                                                                                                 
user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received. 
. . . The term “service provider” means a provider of online services or network access, 
or the operator of facilities therefor . . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1). 
 54. Robert Tur, see infra note 168 and accompanying text, alleges that the video-sharing sites 
are not “service providers.”  See Steve Bryant, Examining Google’s Inheritance: Robert Tur v. 
YouTube, GOOGLEWATCH: EWEEK, Oct. 23, 2006, 
http://googlewatch.eweek.com/content/archive/examining_googles_inheritance_robert_tur_v_you
tube.html#comments, for Robert Tur’s response to Bryant’s article, in which he states, “[c]learly 
[YouTube is] not [an OSP]. Youtube [sic] is first and foremost, a commercial website engaged in 
willful distribution of millions of infringing copyrighted works for a profit.” 
 55. See DRATLER, supra note 45, at 6-44.4. 
 56. See Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001). After quoting part 
of § 512(k)(1)(B), the court did not engage in an analysis of whether the eBay auction Web site 
fell under the DMCA’s definition of “service provider.”  The court stated that eBay’s site, on 
which “sellers . . . post ‘listings’” that describe and display photographs of items for sale, which 
allows buyers to find items to bid on or buy, qualifies as a “‘service provider’ within the meaning 
of Section 512.”  Id. at 1084, 1088. See also CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet. Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 
552 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that a Web site, which allows users or subscribers to upload and post 
commercial real estate listings, is an ISP that, if protected by the DMCA, would fall under § 
512(c)(1)). 
 57. Section 512(c) “applies where a plaintiff seeks to hold an Internet service provider 
responsible for . . . (1) infringing ‘material’ stored and displayed on the service provider’s 
website.”  Hendrickson, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 1088. 
 58. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 59. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). 
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provides notice of infringement that substantially meets § 512(c)(3) 
requirements,61 the service provider is then considered to have the requisite 
knowledge and is, therefore, compelled to act.62 
Aside from receiving proper notice, however, the statute does not 
clarify when or in what other ways service providers may acquire the 
requisite knowledge.63 Most commentators claim that actual knowledge is 
acquired only after the service provider receives notice of infringement, and 
therefore, as long as they remove the infringing material upon receiving 
notice, they are covered.64 However, once courts have found service 
providers liable for contributory infringement,65 which includes a 
requirement of actual or constructive knowledge,66 they have, in effect, 
disregarded any further protection that may or may not have been intended 
by the statute’s enactment.67 
To find actual or constructive knowledge, courts have a copious amount 
of evidence available, especially where the more popular sites are 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)–(B), for notification requirements. See 17 U.S.C. 
§512(g)(1)–(4), for removal requirements and effects, as well as counter-notification 
requirements. Courts have broadly interpreted notice requirements in order to lessen the burden to 
copyright holders when multiple infringements are alleged. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Cmtys., 
Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[N]otification requirements are relaxed to the extent that, 
with respect to multiple works, not all must be identified—only a “representative list. . . . [W]ith 
respect to location information, the copyright holder must provide information that is ‘reasonably 
sufficient’ to permit the service provider to ‘locate’ this material.”). 
 62. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C); see also Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 
1089 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Under the third prong of the test, the service provider’s duty to act is 
triggered . . . upon receipt of proper notice.”). 
 63. However, the Copyright Act does indicate that if a copyright owner does not substantially 
comply with the notification set forth in § 512(c)(3)(A), then the court shall not consider the 
notification as providing the actual knowledge or awareness of the facts or circumstances of 
infringing activity. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i). But see 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii). 
In a case in which the notification . . . fails to comply substantially with all the 
provisions of subparagraph (A) but substantially complies with clauses (ii), (iii), and 
(iv) . . ., clause (i) of this subparagraph applies only if the service provider promptly 
attempts to contact the person making the notification or takes other reasonable steps to 
assist in the receipt of notification that substantially complies with all the provisions of 
subparagraph (A). 
Id. 
 64. See Fred von Lohmann, YouTube’s Balancing Act: Making Money, Not Enemies, 
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, ESQ., July 10, 2006, http://www.hollywoodreporteresq.com 
/thresq/spotlight/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002802746 (explaining why YouTube may 
be shielded by the DMCA). 
 65. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 66. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971) (defining contributory infringement); see also discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 67. See A & M Records, Inc v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(after finding that Napster was liable for contributory infringement, the court refused to engage in 
an analysis of the DMCA provisions, stating that just because the DMCA “explicitly excludes” 
service providers that have actual knowledge from protection, it does not “[shelter] contributory 
infringers”). 
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concerned. The mainstream media and various internet bloggers68 have 
devoted much energy to drawing the public’s attention to several infringing 
videos, making it almost impossible for service providers to avoid the 
commentary.69 Furthermore, YouTube consistently acknowledges its 
awareness of the fact that infringement occurs on the site, and has made 
futile attempts to limit the infringement.70 Although YouTube will claim 
that it was unaware of specific infringing videos before being notified of the 
infringement, and therefore, did not have the requisite knowledge under the 
DMCA,71 since it is obviously aware of several infringing videos and 
activities, it is not a stretch for courts to determine that YouTube was aware 
of the rampant infringement. Moreover, other internet sites, such as 
Australia’s Peekvid.com,72—while it does not host any copyrighted videos 
directly—create indexes of several copyrighted videos already posted on 
YouTube and Google, and subsequently sort the infringing videos into 
categories from which users can choose to view. Its affiliated site, 
KeepVid.com,73 then provides a tool that enables users to download the 
videos they were able to locate on Peekvid.74 The availability of these sites 
draws further attention to the blatant and vast copyright infringement 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See Patrick Goldstein, The People’s Republic of YouTube, L.A. TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 17, 
2006, http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/cl-et-goldstein17oct17,0,171750,print.story? 
coll=la-home-entertainment; see also Mark Cuban, GooTube—The End of DRM?, BLOG 
MAVERICK, THE MARK CUBAN WEBLOG, http://www.blogmaverick.com/2006/10/11/gootube-
the-end-of-drm/; Svokos, supra note 16. 
 69. See Woolley, supra note 19, at 100 (“YouTube began showing up in quick mentions in the 
media, luring still more visitors. . . . Months later that would explode to 3,000 articles per week 
and hundreds of stories on television.”). 
 70. See Your 15 Minutes of Fame..ummm…Make that 10 Minutes or Less, YOUTUBE BLOG, 
Mar. 26, 2006, http://www.youtube.com/blog?entry=oorjVv_HDVs (“We poked around the 
system a bit and found that these longer videos were more likely to be copyrighted videos from tv 
[sic] shows and movies than shorter videos posted.”). While this is a nice gesture, it also provides 
evidence of knowledge, and even may permit courts to infer that YouTube, while not specifically 
encouraging copyright infringement, is not exactly discouraging it either. It is simply limiting the 
duration of the copyrighted clip. Therefore, if users wanted to post numerous ten-minute clips, 
they could potentially post entire episodes. 
 71. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]bsent 
any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot 
be liable for contributory infringement.”). 
 72. Peekvid: Watch Videos Online, http://peekvid.com/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2006). In fact, 
this site allows you to watch entire movies. See The Notebook on Peekvid, 
http://movies.peekvid.com/s3253/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2006) (splitting the movie into 12 
different parts all gathered from YouTube). 
 73. KeepVid: Download videos from Google, YouTube, iFilm, Putfile, Metacafe, 
DailyMotion!, http://keepvid.com/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2006). 
 74. See Louisa Hearn, Video Piracy’s New Battleground, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, June 
26, 2006, http://www.smh.com.au/news/web/video-piracys-new-battleground/2006/06/23/ 
1150845364940.html (“And now that indexes such as Peekvid are building businesses around the 
cataloguing [sic] of content appearing on video sites—including music, sporting clips and even 
entire television programs—pirated content is expected to become even more accessible to the 
casual browser.”). 
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occurring on YouTube and likely provides enough awareness of the 
infringing activity. 
Even if a service provider, upon acquiring knowledge, expeditiously 
removes infringing material, there are other ways for courts to conclude that 
the DMCA does not protect the service provider. For example, if the service 
provider has not implemented technological devices designed to recognize 
and delete copyrighted material, or does not monitor or provide an easy way 
to detect copyrighted material on its Web site, there are no guarantees that 
the infringing material will not be posted by another user at a later date.75 
As a result, known infringement is perpetuated and the service provider is 
hardly able to claim that it did not have actual knowledge of the 
infringement.76 
Because of the extensive media coverage, the inability or reluctance to 
control new videos containing the same content from popping up after they 
have been taken down,77 and the service providers’ own acknowledgment of 
blatant copyright infringement, courts should infer that most of the service 
providers have the requisite knowledge of infringement. At the very least, 
they can conclude that service providers are “aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent,” and, therefore, 
ineligible for safe harbor protection.78 
3. The “Financial Benefit” and the “Right and Ability to 
Control” Requirements 
If a court finds that the service provider lacks the requisite knowledge, 
yet finds that it receives “a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and 
ability to control such activity,”79 the service provider loses DMCA 
                                                                                                                 
 75. In fact, as of Oct. 20, 2006, the SNL video, see infra note 150 and accompanying text, can 
still be found on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_jcEsJz9rY. Although this 
situation should diminish when YouTube rolls out its new technology, see Delaney & Smith, infra 
note 182, at B1 and accompanying text, without such technology, this situation is bound to occur 
repeatedly. 
 76. Furthermore, when multiple copyrights are claimed to have been infringed, § 
512(c)(3)(A)(ii) states that notification of infringement only requires the copyright owner to 
present a “a representative list” of the infringing material. Section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) requires that 
the copyright owner only provide “information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider 
to locate the material.”  Therefore, presumably, if the service provider fails to locate all files 
containing the copyright owner’s material, the service provider can be held liable. 
 77. MySpace has announced that its new tool to combat copyright infringement does include a 
mechanism that prevents other users from uploading the infringing video after it has been taken 
down. See Yuki Noguchi, MySpace Sued Over Music Copyright Claims, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 
2006, at D1. After several entertainment companies filed suit against YouTube, YouTube claimed 
that it was also set to launch its own “video recognition technology” in September 2007. The 
Associated Press, For YouTube, a System to Halt Copyright-Infringing Videos, N.Y. TIMES, July 
28, 2007, at C6. 
 78. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1)(A)(ii). 
 79. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
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protection. Past courts have “embraced a very broad notion of ‘financial 
benefit.’”80 When infringing activity serves as a “draw,” or “enhance[s] the 
attractiveness of the venue,” courts have determined that the service 
provider receives a direct financial benefit.81 Moreover, when a service 
provider derives advertising revenue from the infringing activity or 
material,82 or when “future revenue is directly dependent upon ‘increases in 
userbase [sic],’”83 service providers have been found to have received a 
direct financial benefit.84 Most video-sharing sites contain advertisements 
on pages displaying copyrighted material.85 Therefore, since these video-
sharing sites gain in popularity primarily because of the infringing activity 
that occurs, which consequently, increases advertising revenue,86 courts 
should find direct financial benefit from the infringing activity. 
Section 512(c)(1)(B) also mandates that the service provider have “the 
right and ability to control such activity.”87 Although the DMCA does not 
require service providers to monitor its service or Web sites in order to 
locate and remove infringing material without receiving notice,88 and courts 
have refused to penalize service providers who engage in voluntary, but 
limited monitoring,89 YouTube and other providers can easily observe the 
“infringing activity” occurring directly on its Web site.90 Given that other 
sites do filter out infringing material,91 and since it is possible to develop 
                                                                                                                 
 80. FRED VON LOHMAN, IAAL: WHAT PEER-TO-PEER DEVELOPERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
COPYRIGHT LAW 16 (2006), http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/p2p_copyright_wp_v5.pdf. 
 81. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263–64 (9th Cir. 1996); Perfect 10 
v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 857 (C.D. Cal. 2006); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 82. See Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. at 857 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 83. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See, e.g., Grey’s Anatomy on YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
AejvULMQrJE (last visited Nov. 22, 2006). 
 86. For example, YouTube divides videos into categories such as “Top Rated and “Most 
Views.”  See Recently Featured, http://www.youtube.com/browse?s=rf (last visited Nov. 26, 
2006). A day after Kelly Ripa, co-host of ABC’s “Live with Regis and Kelly” blasted American 
Idol’s Clay Aiken during the show, several clips of the discussion appeared on YouTube at the 
direction of users. These videos were included in the YouTube’s “most views” section. When 
viewing the video, advertisements appeared above the video. Therefore, every time the videos are 
viewed on YouTube and shared with others who are directed to the YouTube page, the number of 
users, and therefore, advertising revenue increases. Furthermore, the availability of the video 
serves as a draw to the site. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WmQPV4L8VdM (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2006). 
 87. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
 88. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m). 
 89. See Hendrickson v. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001). (“Congress 
could not have intended for courts to hold that a service provider loses immunity under the safe 
harbor provision of the DMCA because it engages in acts that are specifically required by the 
DMCA.”). 
 90. See id. (distinguishing between infringing activities that occurred ‘offline’ from those that 
occurred on the actual Web site). 
 91. See supra notes 5, 11 and accompanying text. 
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tools to filter out infringing material,92 courts should conclude that 
YouTube and other video-sharing sites have the “right and ability to control 
such activity.”93 Furthermore, in relying upon the safe harbor provisions for 
protection and ignoring obvious infringing activities occurring on the site, 
they have, in effect, engaged in willful blindness.94 While the smaller Web 
sites may not have the means necessary to implement technological devices 
that can be used to locate and filter out infringing material, presumably 
Google’s YouTube95 and News Corp.’s MySpace96 do have the financial 
means and ability to implement such devices. As of November 2006, both 
YouTube and MySpace were apparently testing out devices and MySpace 
has unveiled an initiative to protect against infringement of audio content.97 
However, several copyrighted videos have appeared, and continue to 
appear, on both sites, and it remains to be seen whether these devices will 
pacify copyright owners. 
4. Conclusion 
Since service providers need to satisfy all three prongs of § 512(c)(1) in 
order to find refuge under the DMCA, YouTube and other video-sharing 
sites should be precluded from finding safety under the DMCA because 
they fail to satisfy at least one of the prongs included within the safe harbor 
provision. Furthermore, because the DMCA codifies much of the common 
law elements of direct,98 contributory,99 and vicarious liability,100 the safe 
harbor offers little protection to service providers already found liable for 
infringement. As one commentator stated, not only did “Congress 
deliberately [leave] the law—with all of its ambiguities—unchanged,”101 
but the “assurance of nonliability applies largely in situations where ISPs 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See Ethan Smith, MySpace Deploys System to Guard Copyright Works, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
31, 2006, at B2. 
 93. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). 
 94. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001). (“Turning a 
blind eye to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liability.”). 
 95. See Holahan, supra note 12. 
 96. News Corporation acquired MySpace for $580 million. See Chris Gaither & Sallie 
Hofmeister, News Corp. to Acquire MySpace; Seeking Web Ad Dollars, the Media Giant Agrees 
to Buy the Parent of the Social-Networking Site, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 2005, at A1. 
 97. See Smith, supra note 92. See also Press Release, CBS and YouTube Strike Strategic 
Content and Advertising Partnership (Oct. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=iXG7e1g-BWI. Finally, in May 2007, 
MySpace announced the launch of its video-recognition tool. See Alex Woodson, MySpace 
‘Down’ with Copyright Tool, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER.COM, May 14, 2007, 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003584525. 
 98. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 99. See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 100. See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
 101. Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, 
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1837 (2000). 
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face no liability in the first place.”102 Unless courts develop one standard for 
indirect liability and another for DMCA protection, as another commentator 
argues must be done,103 once the service provider is found liable for 
copyright infringement, the DMCA will not provide any further protection 
for that infringer. Therefore, unless Congress changes the law to adapt to 
the latest trend in technological development, courts must look to the 
common law elements of copyright liability to determine whether such sites 
are liable for copyright infringement. 
III. CASE LAW PRECEDENT: ARE VIDEO-SHARING WEB SITES 
THE NEXT TO FALL? 
If the service provider fails to find refuge under the DMCA’s safe 
harbor provisions, this does not necessarily mean that it is automatically 
liable for copyright infringement.104 Copyright owners have three claims 
under which they may choose to find video-sharing sites liable: direct, 
vicarious, and contributory liability. On the other hand, all defenses, 
including copyright estoppel,105 fair use,106 and the “Sony-Betamax” 
defense,107 are still available to the service provider.108 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. at 1883 (stating that “risk aversion” is the reason why ISPs would even “undergo the 
expense of complying with the DMCA’s statutory requirements” to protect against liability that 
does not exist in the first place). 
 103. See Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Control: Reading Vicarious Liability for 
Copyright Infringement into the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 75 WASH. L. REV. 
1005, 1007–08 (2000) (“[Arguing] that actual control must be read into 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(1)(B) in 
order to reconcile Title II [of the DMCA] with common law vicarious liability and to preserve the 
structural integrity of Title II.”). 
 104. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(l) (2006) (“The failure of a service provider’s conduct to qualify for 
limitation of liability under this section shall not bear adversely upon the consideration of a 
defense by the service provider that the service provider’s conduct is not infringing under this title 
or any other defense.”); see also CoStar Group v. Loopnet, 373 F.3d 544, 552 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(“[A]n ISP is still entitled to all other arguments under the law—whether by way of an affirmative 
defense or through an argument that conduct simply does not constitute a prima facie case of 
infringement under the Copyright Act.”). 
 105. Copyright estoppel contains four elements: 
(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct 
shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to 
believe it is so intended; (3) the latter must be ignorant of the true facts; and (4) he must 
rely on the former’s conduct to his injury. 
Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960). 
 106. Fair use is an affirmative defense that is available to defendants that have been found liable 
for infringement. The use of copyrighted material “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research,” is not copyright infringement. Courts determine fair 
use depending upon the facts of each case, and consider four factors: (1) the purpose and character 
of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), for the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Fair Use defense. 
  In March 2006, in an attempt to ease the tension between copyright liability and copyright 
protection, YouTube implemented a ten-minute time limit for uploaded videos. See supra note 70 
180 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
A. DIRECT LIABILITY AND HOW IT PERTAINS TO VIDEO-SHARING 
WEB SITES 
The Copyright Act states that “[a]nyone who violates any of the 
exclusive rights of the copyright owner” is liable for copyright 
infringement.109 To establish direct copyright infringement, the plaintiff 
must prove that he or she is the owner of “a valid copyright” and that the 
service provider has violated “one of the exclusive rights granted under 
copyright.”110 Furthermore, “[t]here must be actual infringing conduct with 
a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could 
conclude that the [service provider] himself trespassed on the exclusive 
domain of the copyright owner.”111 Most service providers and peer-to-peer 
networks have not been held liable for direct infringement. This is because 
they were not themselves uploading, “swapping,” or making copies of 
material that was shared, and were acting merely as passive conduits, 
facilitating infringement or transmitting infringing materials.112 Although 
video-sharing sites only host the videos and may not actively participate in 
posting the videos, copyrighted content is publicly displayed throughout the 
sites.113 Undeniably, displaying videos containing both copyrighted and 
non-copyrighted material for the purpose of viewing, commenting on, and 
                                                                                                                 
and accompanying text. The point of limiting the time for uploaded videos is arguably an attempt 
to find refuge within the fair use defense. However, since entire episodes may be uploaded by one 
individual user as long as each clip satisfies the 10-minute limit, YouTube’s actions are not likely 
to ease any such tensions. 
 107. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) 
(announcing that if the product is capable of “substantial noninfringing uses,” the owner of such 
product may not be held contributorily liable). However, courts have declined to apply the Sony 
“staple article of commerce doctrine,” to those who “exercise ongoing control over” their service. 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 916 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (“In Sony, the 
defendant’s participation did not extend past manufacturing and selling the VCRs.”). 
 108. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(l). 
 109. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). See supra note 17 and accompanying text, for a list of the exclusive 
rights. 
 110. Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838 (C.D. Cal 2006). 
 111. CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004). See also Religious 
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 112. See In re: Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding the peer-to-
peer network liable only for the indirect infringement due to the direct infringement of its users); 
Costar, 373 F.3d at 550 (“If the Copyright Act does not hold the owner of the copying machine 
liable as a direct infringer . . ., the ISP should not be found liable as a direct infringer when its 
facility is used by a subscriber to violate a copyright without intervening conduct of the ISP.”); 
Religious Tech. Center, 907 F. Supp. at 1372 (“It would be especially inappropriate to hold liable 
a service that acts more like a conduit, in other words, one that does not itself keep an archive of 
files for more than a short duration.”). 
 113. For example, on Nov. 17, 2006, a search for ABC’s “Grey’s Anatomy” on YouTube.com 
produced 2,195 results. Many were various clips from the television program, while others were 
clips spliced together in music videos, which also contained copyrighted songs. See YouTube, 
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=Grey%27s+Anatomy&search=Search (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2006). Astonishingly, the same search conducted approximately one year later resulted in 
almost 28,000 clips. See YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query= 
Grey%27s+Anatomy&search=Search (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). 
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distributing or sharing, is the Web sites’ purpose; and without the ability to 
display the videos, the sites would be entirely worthless. The problem is 
that publicly displaying copyrighted works is a violation of a copyright 
owner’s exclusive right under § 106(5) of the Copyright Act.114 
Although service providers need only violate one exclusive right to be 
found liable for direct infringement, another exclusive right is also violated 
when sites create indexes using thumbnail versions of the videos. Likewise, 
in a case pending litigation, which involves a similar, but lesser-known 
video-sharing site,115 the copyright owners have alleged that the site is 
liable for direct infringement “because the Web site changed the formats of 
the submitted videos.”116 In addition to changing the formats on MySpace, 
YouTube, and various other sites when indexes are implemented, the 
service providers also create categories for the videos, including “Top 
Rated” and “Most Viewed,” and divide up the videos according to whether 
they are considered entertainment, sports, comedy, etc.117 Several 
copyrighted videos then appear within each of these categories.118 Courts 
could easily determine that this is active participation or intervening 
conduct on behalf of the service provider, and because of this, the sites do 
not act merely as passive conduits.119 Accordingly, service providers may 
be deemed to be reproducing the copyrighted work in a copy,120 violating 
another exclusive right under § 106(1) of the Copyright Act.121 
Consequently, as similar copyright owners have already demonstrated,122 as 
                                                                                                                 
 114. The Copyright Act states that the copyright owner has the exclusive right “to display the 
copyrighted work publicly.”  17 U.S.C. § 106(5). 
 115. Io Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., No. 5:06-CV-03926 (N.D. Cal. filed June 23, 2006). 
See also Delaney, infra note 179. 
 116. Amanda Bronstad, Video Web Sites Download a Defense, NAT’L. L.J., Nov. 2, 2006, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1162375515690. See also Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 
(granting a preliminary injunction because the court found that Google’s creation and display of 
thumbnail versions of Perfect 10’s photos would likely be determined a direct infringement). 
 117. See http://www.youtube.com/browse?s=rf for a list of the categories. 
 118. For example, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GC14VKUI4lg, for a clip of “The 
Oprah Winfrey Show,” which is included in the “comedy” category. Oprah is owned by Harpo 
Productions. See Terms and Conditions—Harpo, http://www2.oprah.com/about/ 
aboutharpo/about_harpo_terms.jhtml#terms (last visited Nov. 25, 2006), for Harpo’s copyright 
policy. 
 119. See CoStar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 551 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a 
Web site that is only involved in storing and transmitting “data in the establishment and 
maintenance of an Internet facility” and is “‘indifferent to the content’” it transmits, functions 
more like a copy machine, and is therefore not directly liable for the infringing activity of its users 
(quoting Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
 120. See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 828 (C.D. Cal 2006). 
 121. The Copyright Act states that the copyright owner has the exclusive right “to reproduce the 
copyrighted work in copies . . . .”  17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
 122. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997) 
(holding Web site operator directly liable for distributing and displaying copyrighted 
photographs); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. 
Tex. 1997) (holding a Web site directly liable for posting copyrighted photographs because the 
Web site “did not function as a mere provider of access” to the Internet). 
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long as the court does not determine that such uses are fair,123 proving that 
the video-sharing Web sites are directly liable for copyright infringement is 
not a difficult task. 
B. INDIRECT LIABILITY AND HOW IT PERTAINS TO VIDEO-SHARING 
WEB SITES 
Indirect liability comes in two forms:124 contributory and vicarious 
infringement. In 2005, the Supreme Court stated: 
When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, 
it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively 
against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go 
against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a 
theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.125 
Although YouTube and others may likely be held liable for their own 
direct infringement, their users are also directly liable for the infringement 
they cause by copying, uploading, and distributing copyrighted video to 
other users or Web sites.126 Although copyright owners have sought user 
information from service providers in the past,127 and in fact, YouTube 
recently “promptly handed over” user information to Paramount Pictures,128 
attacking the service providers and claiming indirect infringement is more 
practicable and time- and cost-effective.129 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See supra note 106, for a description of the fair use defense. 
 124. It may come in three forms, depending upon one’s interpretation of the Court’s use of the 
“inducement theory.”  See FRED VON LOHMANN, IAAL: WHAT PEER-TO-PEER DEVELOPERS 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT COPYRIGHT LAW 4 n. 1 (Jan. 2006), 
https://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/p2p_copyright_wp_v5.pdf (explaining that until courts clarify whether 
traditional contributory infringement has been replaced or whether it has just been supplemented, 
service providers should “avoid any conduct that would give rise to liability under either” theory). 
 125. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005) 
(holding a peer-to-peer network liable for infringement because it distributed the device “with the 
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative 
steps taken to foster infringement”). 
 126. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) & (3). 
 127. See Recording Industry Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 
1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that, under the DMCA provision 512(h), a subpoena to obtain user 
information cannot be issued to a service provider acting merely as a passive conduit). 
 128. Ben Charny, YouTube Shared User Data with Studio Lawyers: Video Site Helped 
Paramount Pictures Track Down and Sue Filmmaker, MARKETWATCH, Oct. 20, 2006, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/youtube-turned-over-user-
data/story.aspx?guid=%7B52DAE3DD%2D70D2%2D4206%2D80A7%2DA809363944E9%7D. 
 129. See In re: Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (“‘[C]hasing 
individual consumers is time consuming and is a teaspoon solution to an ocean problem.’” 
(quoting Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 
ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 442 (2002)); see also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing 
Digital Copyright Infringement without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1376–78 
(2004). 
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1. Contributory Copyright Infringement 
The traditional definition of contributory infringement provides that 
when “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes 
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another,” she is liable 
for copyright infringement.130 In the most recent Supreme Court case 
involving copyright infringement on a peer-to-peer network, however, the 
Court stated that one is a contributory infringer when she “intentionally 
induce[s] or encourage[s] direct infringement.”131 Therefore, before a court 
will find a service provider liable for contributory infringement, there are 
two elements that must be satisfied: (a) knowledge, which includes both 
actual and constructive knowledge,132 and (b) acts of inducement of, 
encouragement of, or a material contribution to, the direct infringement of 
others. Since this note has already argued that YouTube and other video-
sharing services should be found to have the requisite knowledge of user 
infringement,133 the only question remaining is whether the sites have 
induced, encouraged or materially contributed to the direct infringement of 
others. 
In the Grokster opinion, in which the Court held a peer-to-peer network 
liable for indirect infringement, the Court found that the network had 
developed kits and advertisements specifically designed to attract Napster 
users looking for an alternative after record companies filed suit against 
Napster.134 The Court also found an “internal email from a company 
executive” stating that once Napster shut down or started charging fees, he 
wanted Grokster to be the place to which users would flock next.135 For 
these reasons, the Court found that, regardless of whether the device was 
capable of substantial non-infringing uses, because the network’s intent and 
“principal object was use of their software to download copyrighted 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
 131. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). In so 
defining contributory liability, the Court cited Gershwin Publ’g, 443 F.2d at 1162. Therefore, 
whether the traditional definition has been replaced or just supplemented is an issue that will need 
to be addressed by the Court in subsequent cases. For purposes of this note, I am combining the 
two within a single analysis of contributory infringement. However, in its complaint against 
YouTube, see Helft and Fabrikant, infra note 177 and accompanying text, Viacom chose to treat 
inducement and contributory liability as distinct claims. See Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief and Damages at 21, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-02103 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). UMG did the same in its complaint against MySpace. See Complaint for Direct, 
Contributory, and Vicarious Copyright Infringement, for Inducement of Copyright Infringement, 
and for Violations of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, UMG Recordings, Inc. 
v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 06-07361 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 132. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 133. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
 134. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 924–25. 
 135. Id. 
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works,”136 the evidence presented was enough to conclude that the network 
was liable for contributory or inducement liability.137 
Video-sharing sites would contend that, by responding to infringement 
notices and expeditiously removing infringing content, they are effectively 
cooperating with copyright owners and actually discouraging infringement. 
However, because Grokster had never developed tools to filter out 
infringing material and also made money by selling advertising space to 
accompany the infringing activity, these actions—or lack thereof—added 
fuel to the Court’s conclusion that Grokster’s objectives were unlawful.138 
Accordingly, in a case against YouTube or MySpace, these same or similar 
arguments may be used against them to prove an unlawful intent. 
Nevertheless, because YouTube and other service providers have satisfied 
the DMCA requirements for taking down the infringing material once they 
receive notice of infringement, courts may not find YouTube liable based 
on the inducement theory. 
Other courts, however, have given broad meaning to the term “material 
contribution” and have found that if a service provider stores infringing 
copies of works on a server, and provides access to those copies to other 
users, it may indicate that the service provider materially contributed to the 
infringement.139 Therefore, if courts analyze contributory liability based on 
traditional notions, instead of focusing on the Grokster theory, YouTube 
and other sites may be prime targets for contributory liability. 
2. Vicarious Copyright Infringement 
A service provider may also be held liable for vicarious infringement 
when there is direct profit from the infringement and the service provider 
“has a right and ability to supervise the direct infringer, even if the [service 
provider] initially lacks knowledge of the infringement.”140 These elements 
have been codified by the DMCA,141 and therefore, for purposes of this 
argument, since the analysis is nearly identical, it is not necessary to 
analyze vicarious liability further. 
3. Conclusion 
Copyright holders have enough evidence to support allegations of direct 
or indirect copyright infringement against most video-sharing sites; and 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id. at 926. 
 137. Id. at 941. The court emphasized the network’s “purposeful, culpable expression and 
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 138. Id. at 939–40. 
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 140. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 931 n.9. 
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contrary to what most commentators have been saying,142 the DMCA 
provides only a thin veil of protection. Threatening such sites with suit in 
order to apply pressure on them to cooperate further with copyright owners 
is essential to maintaining control over content. Furthermore, it is crucial 
for obtaining the benefit of copyright protection.143 Likewise, suing smaller 
sites that are engaging in rampant copyright infringement, in order to 
establish precedent, is also essential and necessary to “promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts.”144 Arguably, however, forcing sites like 
YouTube or MySpace to shut down or become a fee-based service à la 
Napster—a service that has been struggling to stay afloat145—will only 
anger consumers, decrease viewership, and stifle digital innovation. 
Consequently, although the entertainment industry’s response to the new 
digital phenomenon may be frenzied and “shockingly slow,”146 there are 
indications that the industry is finally catching on. And this time, it may not 
be too late.147 
IV. FRIEND OR FOE: THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY’S 
SCHIZOPHRENIC RESPONSE TO THE DIGITAL 
PHENOMENON 
A. THE FRENZIED NETWORK RESPONSES 
Over the latter part of 2006, the entertainment industry’s reaction to the 
recent explosion and popularity of video-sharing sites has been increasingly 
frenzied.148 As this section demonstrates, there have been some positive 
reactions, yet most indicate that the industry is both ambivalent and 
inconsistent in its decision-making pertaining to whether to take action 
                                                                                                                 
 142. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 19 (“[YouTube’s] ‘beg for forgiveness’ approach—taking 
copyrighted content off its site only when faced with a complaint—probably places them 
comfortably within the safe harbor provisions of 1998’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act.”). 
 143. Arguably, without the threat of suit or the ability to hold the sites responsible for blatant 
and on-going copyright infringement, there will be no incentive for the sites to make deals and 
share revenue. Furthermore, without a finding of liability, content owners will likely no longer be 
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 144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 145. See Geist, supra note 19, at C3. 
 146. McKenna, supra note 2. 
 147. See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 148. Compare, e.g., Steve Johnson, YouTube’s Dream Could Get Clipped, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 
2006, at C1 (“When you take into account . . . Comedy Central’s wink-and-a-nod at the 
proliferation of ‘Daily Show’ and ‘Colbert Report’ clips that users upload, . . . copyright holders 
seem to be deciding that the promotional value of YouTube . . . is valuable.”), with Noam Cohen, 
YouTube is Purging Copyrighted Clips, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at C8 (“The site late last week 
began purging copyrighted material from Comedy Central, including clips from YouTube 
stalwarts like ‘The Daily Show with Jon Stewart,’ ‘The Colbert Report’ and ‘South Park’ . . . 
[which] was a ‘result of third-party notification by Comedy Central.’”). 
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against, or to work with, such sites. Some entertainment conglomerates 
perceive the sites’ blatant and severe copyright infringement as a beneficial 
promotional tool, embracing and/or partnering up with the sites, while 
others argue that the service providers are reaping benefits they do not 
deserve to reap.149 
In February 2006, after NBC discovered that a user uploaded its now 
infamous Saturday Night Live skit entitled “Chronicles of Narnia,”150 onto 
YouTube’s site, which users then viewed approximately five million times, 
the network sent YouTube a notice, allegedly asking the site to “remove 
about 500 clips of NBC material from its site or face legal action.”151 NBC 
waited until after the video had hit its “peak download period” before 
asking that the video be taken off the site,152 evidently recognizing the 
promotional value in allowing the clip to be seen by millions of viewers. 
Consequently, while NBC continues to monitor YouTube’s site in search of 
user-uploaded copyrighted videos,153 in June 2006, the network decided to 
partner up with YouTube.154 Six months later, NBC posted a different 
Saturday Night Live skit after presumably realizing that, by allowing 
viewers to watch a skit from a program that had seemingly lost its spark, 
new interest in the program could be generated and, consequently, a new 
spark ignited.155 However, it remains to be seen how long this partnership 
will last since NBC Universal recently created National Broadband 
Company (NBBC), which will distribute programming to internet sites 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Compare, e.g., Greg Johnson & Lance Pugmire, NHL, YouTube Reach Video Agreement, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at D3 (“The NHL clearly understands the value of the community 
factor on YouTube. This is designed to help … connect with their fans.”) (internal quotation 
omitted), with Ken Fisher, YouTube and the Copyright Cops: Safe… for now?, ARSTECHNICA, 
July 16, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060716-7273.html (“[W]hy does the BBC 
get hit with letters, licensing demands, and potential lawsuits when they use unauthorized 
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viewing at NBC 24/7 Video, http://www.nbc.com/Video/videos/snl_1432_narnia.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2006) and can also be downloaded from Apple iTunes. See Live, from iTunes, it’s 
‘Saturday Night’, CNNMONEY, Jan. 10, 2006, http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/10/technology/ 
apple_snl/index.htm. 
 151. John Biggs, Media Talk; A Video Clip Goes Viral, and a TV Network Wants to Control It, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at C5. “Chronicles of Narnia” is also known as “Lazy Sunday.” 
 152. Peter Pollack, NBC Orders Removal of Video from Download Site, ARSTECHNICA, Feb. 
17, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060217-6213.html. 
 153. See Stone, supra note 19 (describing how NBC would probably have to ask YouTube to 
again remove the SNL clip from the site when a user uploaded the video after YouTube had 
removed it). 
 154. See Press Release, YouTube, NBC and YouTube Announce Strategic Partnership (June 27, 
2006), available at http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=c0g5-NsDdJQ (“[A] . . . 
partnership . . . will combine NBC’s . . . programming with YouTube’s vast audience . . . to 
promote NBC’s Fall program lineup and other preferred shows over the next year.”). 
 155. See Pete Cashmore, YouTube Gives NBC a Hit in a Box, MASHABLE!, Dec. 19, 2006, 
http://mashable.com/2006/12/19/youtube-gives-nbc-a-hit-in-a-box/ (“Not only have the SNL clips 
dominated YouTube’s Most Viewed and Top Rated clips this week, but they’ve also been the 
most linked-to videos . . . .”). 
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“including CNET, Forbes, and the About.com unit of The New York Times 
Company.”156 
Like NBC, CBS has also demonstrated its apparent uncertainty 
pertaining to the video-sharing site’s value. Early in 2006, CBS asked 
YouTube to remove a video of an autistic teen who, in four minutes, scored 
twenty points during his high school basketball team’s last game of the 
year.157 This video, which appeared on CBSNews.com, was also uploaded 
onto YouTube, and CBS soon realized that bloggers were directing more 
viewers to the video on YouTube than to its actual source. As a result, the 
video soon “became the most viewed video of the week” on YouTube.158 
Eventually, CBS also learned its lesson, and in October 2006, the network 
and YouTube struck a deal.159 Consequently, a month later, YouTube 
announced that CBS’s content was among the “most viewed videos on 
YouTube,” much to the delight of YouTube and CBS executives.160 
ABC, however, has chosen a different route. Upon learning that a racy 
scene from an unaired clip of ABC’s hit show “Desperate Housewives” had 
found its way onto YouTube without permission, ABC demanded that 
YouTube remove the clip.161 Consequently, although ABC recognized the 
site’s value in terms of attracting viewers, instead of partnering up with 
YouTube, the network dedicated its resources to creating its own site upon 
which viewers can watch recently aired episodes of some of the most 
popular ABC programs.162 Although this is certainly a viable option, ABC 
may have disregarded YouTube’s value a little too quickly.163 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Saul Hansell, NBC and Its Stations Venture Into Online Video Market, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
13, 2006, at C2. Interestingly, over a year later, “NBC pulled its channel off of YouTube” in 
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http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1003086573. 
 162. See Nate Anderson, Disney-ABC: “We understand piracy now as a business model”, 
ARSTECHNICA, Oct. 10, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20061010-7946.html (“[T]he 
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 163. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
188 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
Finally, Comedy Central sent YouTube a notice to remove “Colbert 
Report” and “The Daily Show with John Stewart” clips, after months of 
Comedy Central’s seemingly implicit consent to the widespread 
dissemination of such clips via YouTube and other video-sharing sites.164 A 
week later, however, the clips found their way back onto the site, which 
made commentators suspect that a potential deal was on the horizon 
between Viacom—under whose corporate umbrella Comedy Central 
exists—and YouTube.165 Besides Viacom’s subsequent filing of a lawsuit, 
however, which is discussed in the next section, the networks have yet to 
take further action against YouTube. This is arguably due to their 
uncertainty pertaining to whether YouTube’s promotional value exceeds the 
networks’ potential revenue loss, or from their reluctance to take action 
until the law is more firmly developed. 
B. INTRODUCING: THE LAWSUITS 
For the majority of 2006, YouTube had been running smoothly, 
allowing users to upload copyrighted video, while maintaining that the 
DMCA “safe harbor” protected the site from liability.166 On July 14, 2006, 
however, YouTube received its first blow when Robert Tur filed suit in the 
United States District Court, Central District of California.167 Tur, owner 
and operator of Los Angeles News Service and copyright owner of the 
famous Reginald Denny beating video and several others, 168 claimed that 
he was entitled to “$150,000 for each work infringed upon and a court order 
enjoining YouTube from allowing his work [to] be posted on the Web 
site.”169 While YouTube believes Tur’s claim is “without merit,” given the 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See YouTube Takes Down Comedy Central Clips Based on DMCA Claims, NEWSCLOUD, 
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 166. See Simmons, supra note 47. 
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recent decisions that have gone against similar types of services, the court 
may not agree.170 
In addition to Tur’s lawsuit, Universal Music Group’s Chief Executive 
received much attention after he threatened suit against both MySpace and 
YouTube, allegedly stating that the sites owe Universal “tens of millions of 
dollars” for allowing copyrighted material to appear on the site.171 
However, soon after these remarks were made, Universal decided to partner 
up with YouTube,172 and about a week later, filed suit against Bolt.com173 
and Grouper.com,174 two smaller, lesser-known video-sharing sites.175 
Thereafter, the threats against MySpace became a reality when, on 
November 17, 2006, Universal filed suit against the social-networking 
site.176 
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Finally, after several months of negotiations failed and after much 
media speculation about an impending deal, in early 2007 Viacom filed suit 
against YouTube for copyright violations. 177 In this suit, Viacom is 
“seeking more than $1 billion in damages and an injunction prohibiting 
Google and YouTube from committing further infringement.”178 
Unfortunately, if these video-sharing sites continue to allow 
copyrighted work to appear without taking further action to prevent such 
proliferation, these claims are bound to continue until the video sharing 
sites develop more intelligent business plans.179 Fortunately, however, there 
are other options that could prove to be mutually beneficial, and both the 
sites and some industry giants are finally figuring this out. 
C. ISSUES IN THE INTERIM 
Aside from the network deals, many entertainment conglomerates have 
chosen to take advantage of YouTube’s popularity, while others have 
engaged various file sharing sites to display and/or distribute their videos.180 
In September, Warner Music Group (WMG), for example, negotiated a 
partnership deal with YouTube, making WMG “the first music company to 
harness YouTube’s leading video entertainment service to commercially 
distribute its music video catalog.”181 However, this partnership was formed 
after YouTube developed plans to “[roll] out technology designed to 
automatically spot copyrighted material that users upload without the 
permission of media companies.”182 This system “is an ambitious effort to 
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http://www.youtube.com/press_room_entry?entry=vCfgHo5_Fb4 (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). 
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ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at B1. 
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give media companies more control over the video on the site and to 
address their fears that others will profit from consumers’ piracy of their 
content.”183 WMG may have been the first to embrace this new technology; 
however, others are slowly beginning to follow suit.184 
While YouTube is, ostensibly, more than willing to work with industry 
giants in order to develop solutions that might combat copyright 
infringement for the major corporations while simultaneously and 
strategically benefiting economically, these solutions do not remedy the 
entire problem. The development of filtering tools may, in the short-term, 
quiet some of the industry giants. However, Robert Tur and other smaller 
companies and creators, who make their living off of licensing and royalty 
payments, will not be able to participate.185 This means that they will still 
have the extremely arduous and tedious task of policing the site and 
complying with the “notice” provisions under the DMCA186 to make sure 
their work is not uploaded, viewed, and then shared with several millions of 
Internet users without permission or payment. Unless the sites are willing to 
take a firmer stance against the proliferation of copyright infringement, 
these tools will only solve part of the problem. Because the digital age has 
spawned developments in all areas, chances are, technologically savvy 
users will find ways to circumvent YouTube’s new technology 
(notwithstanding the fact that this is, of course, illegal)187 and find new, 
perhaps lesser-known, sites on which to post copyrighted material.188 
The recent lawsuits filed by Universal, Viacom, and the pending class 
action,189 as well as the rest of the industry’s conflicting responses upon 
finding its copyrighted content spread throughout the Internet, demonstrate 
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192 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
the industry’s lack of certainty and fruitless attempt to figure out what the 
law actually means and what kind of protection it actually provides. 
Therefore, we will undoubtedly continue to see these video-sharing Web 
sites going by way of the peer-to-peer networks unless they figure out how 
to play ball with the corporate giants.190 Ultimately however, service 
providers and entertainment conglomerates need to realize that they must 
work together with, not against, one another if they want to continue to 
exist and prosper in the digital realm. 
V. ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY, MEET CONSUMER DEMAND 
A. THE BOTTOM LINE 
Peer-to-peer networks such as Napster, Grokster, and Aimster were 
innovative ideas that failed primarily because the providers instituted faulty 
business models. They also failed because they built systems that were 
designed to induce or encourage users to infringe upon copyright owners’ 
valid and exclusive rights while refusing to cooperate with the corporate 
entities that controlled their fate. Regardless of what small businesses or 
independent creators may think of the entertainment giants, they cannot 
build successful business models that are designed to break copyright law, a 
law that has enjoyed tremendous support for over 200 years.191 As history 
indicates, companies that derive revenue or gain in popularity by selling a 
product that is not theirs to sell will fall prey to those with the power to 
control and/or destroy them. As long as copyrighted material continues to 
appear on the sites, unless video-sharing Web sites succumb to industry 
pressure and combine forces with the corporate powers against whom they 
had previously fought, these sites will likely become the next Napster, 
Grokster, or Aimster. 
The entertainment industry, moreover, must also learn from past 
mistakes. As one commentator has already pointed out, once the major 
entertainment companies successfully shut down Napster, entities other 
than the record companies ended up reaping the benefits.192 While the 
record companies won the legal battle, they lost the opportunity to profit 
substantially from the achievement. Therefore, instead of shutting down the 
sites, the entertainment industry must recognize that “[c]ompanies such as 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In Re: 
Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 191. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 192. “[Major media companies] battled Napster and other file sharing services into submission. 
. . . [and] left the door wide open for the Apple iPod and iTunes service to dominate the legitimate 
market. It’s a business that should have belonged to the music industry, not Apple. . . . It’s as if 
providing music and videos to consumers is an afterthought for these guys. They don’t seem to 
really care how consumers buy their music, so long as they don’t steal it. Talk about a failed 
business model.” McKenna, supra note 2. 
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YouTube, MySpace and others have created entirely new markets where the 
major content providers apparently saw no value;”193 and the digital age has 
spawned technological developments and innovation over which the 
industry can no longer maintain complete control. Even if the industry 
figures out how to create Web sites using technology comparable to the 
video-sharing sites,194 the ease and convenience of one-stop shopping is 
presumably more appealing than having to search each individual site for 
content.195 For example, although ABC’s actions196 may prove to be a 
qualified success for the network, there are a few reasons why it would 
presumably be even more lucrative to partner up with sites such as 
YouTube.  
First, the ABC favorites will inevitably appear on YouTube regardless 
of whether ABC or a user uploads the clips unless and until YouTube 
implements video-recognition technology. If ABC is already allowing users 
to view entire episodes, and YouTube implements tools to recognize 
copyrighted content, the network can then reap the monetary rewards every 
time a user views an ABC clip. Next, if users view clips that capture their 
interest, the ten minute time-limit that YouTube imposes on certain videos 
may leave them thirsty for more. Therefore, the higher quality video that 
ABC can provide may encourage users to visit ABC’s site to view the entire 
episode. ABC then profits from displaying their videos on YouTube as well 
as their own Web site and increases their viewership and popularity among 
video-sharing Web site users.197 
                                                                                                                 
 193. McKenna, supra note 2. “‘If we had licensed Napster we could have saved ourselves 
billions and got a real head start in digital music,’” one music executive said. ‘But as usual the 
lawyers had the loudest voices.’” Dominic Rushe & Paul Durman, Google helps media giants see 
things YouTube’s way, U.K. TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 15, 2006, 
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,20411-2404038.html. 
 194. “Even today, the media conglomerates are doing a pitiful job of getting their content into 
the hands of consumers. Universal Music’s website, . . ., is slow and clunky.”  Mckenna, supra 
note 2. 
 195. While writing this note, media giants including NBC Universal, News Corp., Viacom and 
possibly CBS, were preparing to announce that they were trying to put together a “new Web site 
that will feature some of their best-known television programming and other clips in an attempt to 
build a business for distributing video on the Internet to rival YouTube.” Richard Siklos & Bill 
Carter, Old Model Versus A Speedster, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2006, at C1. Commentators 
immediately began expressing doubts about whether the networks would get along well enough to 
make it work, and also about its effectiveness. See id.; see also Pete Cashmore, “Anti-YouTube” 
May Be Announced Next Week: Really Bad Idea, MASHABLE!, Dec. 17, 2006, 
http://mashable.com/2006/12/17/anti-youtube/ (“YouTube is the media darling right now—the 
little startup whose founders took on the big guys and won. . . . [B]uilding a whole new site seems 
about as likely to succeed as trying to build your own iTunes clone.”). By March 2007, News 
Corp. and NBC announced they had concluded a deal “to showcase their own programming across 
the Internet’s biggest Web sites, as well as a new jointly owned Web destination.”  See Richard 
Siklos, News Corp. and NBC in Web Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2007, at C1. 
 196. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
 197. One commentator adds that “you can’t expect YouTube users to be driven to your content 
if you’re not promoting it in any way. It seems likely that while the number of viewers to CBS 
shows has risen, those US networks that don’t promote their content have seen no difference.”  
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As the law continues to adapt to new developments, those who wish to 
exercise control over their work must also adapt. Once a precedent is set 
and copyright owners prove one more time that working within the law is 
the better and more profitable idea,198 those who are finding these new 
markets need to join forces with the entertainment industry, and the 
entertainment giants must refrain from blindly shutting these innovators 
down. 
Finally, copyright laws were developed to inspire and compensate 
artists for their creations. Video-sharing sites that respond to these desires, 
such as Revver,199 which pays users who upload and share videos each time 
another user clicks on an advertisement accompanying the video and 
monitors all videos uploaded, have responded to copyright law’s purpose 
and should be commended.200 However, even when a service provider 
claims that every video is inspected to prevent a user from uploading 
copyrighted content, there are bound to be those that slip through the 
cracks. Therefore, in order to survive, service providers must show 
copyright owners that they are eager and prepared to do everything in their 
power to combat the copyright infringement that occurs on their Web sites. 
B. THE SOLUTION 
To ease the tension among copyright owners’ concerns, user desires, 
and digital innovation, as well as to avoid potential lawsuits, there needs to 
be a compromise. Presumably, service providers cannot control every one 
of their subscribers’ actions. They can, however, show copyright owners 
that they are taking all practicable steps to prevent against copyright 
infringement occurring on their sites. To do so, there are a few simple steps 
that should be followed. First, home pages of every video-sharing Web site 
should indicate in bold letters that the forum must not be used for uploading 
and displaying copyrighted video. Because the average consumer may not 
know exactly what copyright infringement laws entail, the service provider 
should provide some examples of infringing activity. If the service provider 
does not want this material listed directly on the home page, the provider 
should explicitly and boldly direct users to a page containing copyright 
information. Second, once subscribers sign up and an e-mail is sent to his or 
her address to confirm registration, the e-mail should clearly state the 
service provider’s policy against copyright infringement and repeat 
                                                                                                                 
Pete Cashmore, YouTube vs[.] TV, MASHABLE!, Nov. 27, 2006, 
http://mashable.com/2006/11/27/youtube-vs-tv/ (noting that YouTube may be stealing viewers 
away from television, at least in the U.K). ABC News, however, does have a deal with Yahoo! 
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 198. See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
 199. See Revver, supra note 5. 
 200. See What is Revver?, http://one.revver.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2007); Copyright 
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infringers. Third, before a subscriber may upload his or her video on to the 
site, there should be a tool for verifying ownership that also informs 
subscribers of the consequences of their misrepresentation. Fourth, the 
service provider must implement tools to identify and protect against 
infringing material—whether by monitoring the site or through 
technological devices. 
Although these tools may not be able to identify every unauthorized 
copyrighted video or song, it would at least ease most copyright owners’ 
concerns. If the copyright owners later discovered their video displayed on 
the site, they can then initiate the DMCA’s notice-and-takedown 
procedures.201 At that point, if a user should attempt to upload the video 
again, the filtering tool should identify the video, and prevent it from being 
uploaded again. Without these actions or tools, the incentive for copyright 
owners to cooperate with the video-sharing sites is compromised. 
Finally, depending upon how much control the copyright owner wants 
to exert over the distributed content, each copyright owner can craft a deal 
that makes sense for them and meets their individualized needs. As 
evidenced by the CBS-YouTube deal,202 the Universal-YouTube deal,203 
and the WMG-YouTube deal,204 there are ways to satisfy consumers, video-
sharing sites, and the entertainment conglomerates without resorting to a 
legal battle. Through partnership, cooperation, and good faith efforts, the 
Robert Turs, the Universals, the music publishers, the video-sharing Web 
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